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COMMENTS
ALLOCATING RISK IN TAKE-OR-PAY
CONTRACTS: ARE FORCE MAJEURE AND
COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY THE
SAME DEFENSE?
by Harold Alexander Lewis
USTICE Oliver Wendell Holmes once said that parties entering into a
contract primarily focus on performing the contract rather than on
breaching it, and that contractual provisions therefore generally concern
the results of performance rather than the results of a breach.' Justice
Holmes's statement, however, does not accurately depict the provisions of
natural gas take-or-pay contracts, 2 which often include detailed and complex
language designed to allocate the risks of certain occurrences between the
parties. This Comment explores the courts' role in giving effect to the risk
allocation language of take-or-pay contracts. More specifically, this Com-
ment focuses on the application of the doctrine of commercial impracticabil-
ity, as defined in Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) section 2-615, 3 to the
construction of force majeure clauses 4 in take-or-pay contracts.
1. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 302 (1946).
2. A typical take-or-pay provision provides: "Buyer agrees to purchase and receive from
Seller or to pay for if available but not taken, a quantity of gas equal to ... [a specified percent]
... of the Delivery Capacity of each well .... " Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, Take or
Litigate: Enforcing the Plain Meaning of the Take-or-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts, 40
ARK. L. REV. 185, 187 (1986). A take-or-pay provision allows a producer to maintain its cash
flow during the life of the well and offers a secure and dedicated reserve of gas to the pipeline.
Id. at 187-90.
3. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1987) provides in part:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation ...
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller ... is not
a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been
made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the nonoccurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compli-
ance in good faith with any . . . governmental regulation or order ....
Courts and commentators have noted that § 2-615 embodies the doctrine of commercial im-
practicability. See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283, 293 (7th
Cir. 1974); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp. 1319,
1323 (E.D. La. 1981); Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under
Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 16; Walter, Commercial Impracticability in Con-
tracts, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225, 227 (1987).
4. A typical force majeure clause in a take-or-pay contract provides, in pertinent part:
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The primary issue is whether under a force majeure clause a court may
excuse a party's performance because the occurrence of a force majeure
event has rendered the party's performance commercially impracticable.
Several courts have recently addressed this issue. 5 The decisions evidence
confusion about the interaction between section 2-615 and a force majeure
clause and reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between
the commercial impracticability excuse and the force majeure excuse. A
force majeure clause allocates to one party the risks arising from the occur-
rence of a specifically contemplated event. 6 Section 2-615, on the other
hand, allocates the risks arising from events that the parties neither contem-
plated nor allocated. 7 More importantly, the party seeking an excuse under
a force majeure clause must show that a force majeure event actually pre-
vents its performance. 8 The party seeking a section 2-615 excuse, con-
versely, must show not that the event has prevented its performance, but
that it merely has rendered its performance commercially impracticable. 9 If
an event within the force majeure clause occurs, a court must determine the
appropriateness of granting an excuse under the force majeure clause by re-
ferring to the rules of construction applicable to force majeure clauses.' 0 If
an event not within the force majeure clause occurs, however, the court must
find guidance outside of the contract under the rules set forth in section 2-
615. Because of this fundamental distinction, a court should not refer to
section 2-615 to determine the appropriateness of granting an excuse under a
If either party is rendered unable by force majeure, or any other cause of any
kind not reasonably within its control, wholly or in part, to perform or comply
with any obligation or condition of this Agreement, upon such party's giving
timely notice and reasonably full particulars to the other party such obligation
or condition shall be suspended during the continuance of the inability so caused
and such party shall be relieved of liability and shall suffer no prejudice for
failure to perform the same during such period; ... The term "force majeure"
shall include, without limitation by the following enumeration, acts of God, and
the public enemy, the elements, fire, accidents, breakdowns, strikes, differences
with workmen, and any other industrial, civil or public disturbance, or any act
or omission beyond the control of the party having the difficulty, and any re-
strictions or restraints imposed by laws, orders, rules, regulations or acts of any
government or governmental body or authority ....
Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc. v. Southern Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327, 1329 n.1 (4th Cir. 1987);
see also Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, supra note 2, at 222 n. 117 (1986) (another example of a
typical force majeure clause). The notion of force majeure arose originally to address those
occurrences, such as acts of God, that humans had no power to control. See Nissho-Iwai Co.
v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 1530, 1540 (5th Cir. 1984); Squillante & Congalton,
Force Majeure, 80 COM. L.J. 4, 5 (1979).
5. See Hamilton Bros. Oil Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. CIV-88-132-A (W.D. Okla.
Feb. 21, 1989); ANR Pipeline Co. v. Devon Energy Corp., No. G86-1123 CA (W.D. Mich.
Feb. 1, 1989); Dyco Petroleum Corp. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 86-C-1097-C (N.D. Okla.
Sept. 1, 1988); Burkhart Petroleum Corp. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 87-C-257-C (N.D. Okla.
June 30, 1988); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. ANR Pipeline Co., 768 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
6. See infra note 99.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 48-50.
8. See infra note 114.
9. See infra note 47.
10. See infra notes 100-07.
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force majeure clause. The recent decisions noted above' I have overlooked
this fundamental distinction.
This Comment focuses on gas sales contracts between producers and pipe-
lines for two reasons. First, recent judicial action concerning both the appli-
cation of UCC section 2-61512 and the construction of force majeure
provisions 13 has occurred in take-or-pay litigation. Second, several courts
addressing take-or-pay claims have implicitly answered the issue presented
above without specifically addressing the implications of such judicial risk
allocation.14 These decisions may have a dramatic effect on the outcome of
pending take-or-pay litigation, because they take an authoritative step in the
opposite direction from prior take-or-pay litigation.'"
This Comment consists of three parts. The first part sets forth the eco-
nomic and regulatory background of the natural gas industry. The second
part discusses the legal setting of the take-or-pay controversy. It focuses on
the development of the common law excuse of commercial impracticability,
on the treatment of that excuse in UCC section 2-615, and on the scope of
the law surrounding the force majeure excuse. Part three analyzes the recent
decisions that have incorrectly combined the two excuses.
I. BACKGROUND: THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
To understand best how the issue addressed in this Comment arose, one
must grasp the economic and regulatory underpinnings of the natural gas
industry. 16 Prior to 1930, producers realized little value from natural gas
they owned: They could not store the gas once it was extracted, and they
could not transport it beyond a very limited distance because modern pipe-
line technology had yet to become available. For those interested in the
more lucrative oil that often lay underneath, the gas was a bothersome by-
product of which the operator had to dispose before producing oil. 17 By the
11. See cases cited supra note 5.
12. See Reading & Bates Petroleum Co. v. Transok, Inc., No. CJ-85-1992 (Tulsa County
Dist. Ct., Okla. Jan. 27, 1987); Challenger Minerals, Inc. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., No. 84-
C-357-E (N.D. Okla. Sept. 9, 1986), withdrawn as settled (Nov. 26, 1986); Thomas N. Berry &
Co. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., No. CIV-85-1430-R (W.D. Okla. May 15, 1986); Lively
Exploration Co. v. Valero Transmission Co., No. 2930 (Sutton County Dist. Ct., 112th Jud.
Dist. of Texas, Sept. 16, 1985).
13. See Superior Oil Co. v. Transco Energy Co., 616 F. Supp. 98 (W.D. La. 1985); Golsen
v. ONG W., Inc., 756 P.2d 1209 (Okla. 1988); Valero Transmission Co. v. Mitchell Energy
Corp., 743 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
14. See International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Dyco Petroleum Corp. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 86-
C-1097-C (N.D. Okla. Sept. 1, 1988); Burkhart Petroleum Corp. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 87-
C-257-C (N.D. Okla. June 30, 1988).
15. See infra notes 124-48 and accompanying text for the complete analysis of the cases'
application of the force majeure and § 2-615 excuses.
16. This discussion draws primarily from Moody, The Natural Gas Industry After Partial
Deregulation, 36 INST. OF OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N § 6 (1985); E. SANDERS, THE REGULATION
OF NATURAL GAS: POLICY AND POLITICS, 1938-1978 (1981); S. WILLIAMS, THE NATURAL
GAS REVOLUTION OF 1985 (1985).
17. E. SANDERS, supra note 16, at 24-25; Tannenbaum, Commercial Impracticability
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Natural Gas Distributors' Vehicle for Excusing Long-
Term Requirements Contracts?, 20 Hous. L. REV. 771, 771 (1983).
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early 1930s, however, technology had advanced sufficiently to allow compa-
nies to construct lengthy interstate pipelines.18 These new pipelines created
an interstate market for the gas and increased its value to producers. 19 De-
spite the emergence of a national pipeline system, the natural gas industry
lacked the ability to service the nation consistently. 20 As a response to the
problematical structure of the industry, Congress enacted the Natural Gas
Act of 1938 (NGA).2 1
In enacting the NGA, Congress set in place a regulatory scheme that still
affects producers and pipelines today.22 Commentators have described the
environment in which producers and pipelines have operated since passage
of the NGA as "a roller coaster ride" 23 through "inconsistent and vacilla-
tory" government demands that have rendered the industry incapable of re-
sponding to the nation's energy needs. 24 The NGA institutionalized a
defectively structured industry. One of the NGA's primary failings was its
complex system of price controls.2 5 These controls caused shortages of gas
because producers refused to explore for new gas reserves with the promise
of only a meager return under the regulatory scheme. 26 This shortage in-
duced sharp competition among pipelines for secure, long-term supplies of
gas. 27 The pipelines responded to this heightened competition by offering to
producers what they could: the maximum lawful wellhead price for the gas
and generous take-or-pay clauses. 28
Congress reacted to the failings of the NGA by enacting the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).29 The NGPA reversed the trends that had
spurred the pipelines' actions under the NGA by removing many of the
18. E. SANDERS, supra note 16, at 24.
19. Id.
20. "In the first years of the Great Depression, the natural gas industry was in chaos. In
the East, it was marked by monopoly, shortage, and increasing prices. In the Southwest, there
was an enormous oversupply; thousands of producers .. . [let] millions of cubic feet of gas
escape into the atmosphere." E. SANDERS, supra note 16, at 24; see also Pierce, Natural Gas
Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 68 (1982) (discussing history
behind producer price regulation).
21. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 717-717z (West 1976 & Supp. 1989).
22. See S. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 1 (outlining the complex regulatory framework
existing in 1985).
23. Moody, supra note 16, § 6.01, at 6-2.
24. Tannenbaum, supra note 17, at 771.
25. See S. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 1.
26. See E. SANDERS, supra note 16, at 125.
27. The gas industry traditionally operated under a structure of long-term supply con-
tracts, see Moody, supra note 16, § 6.03, at 6-8, and economic conditions fostered unparalleled
competition to secure these contracts. The contracts, as a result, became more producer-ori-
ented. See S. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 6-8.
28. See S. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 7-8, 13 n.12 (arguing that take-or-pay provisions
were the primary competitive tool for pipelines).
29. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982)). The NGPA sought not only to unlock gas from the intrastate
market to alleviate the regulation-induced interstate shortage but also eventually to deregulate
all natural gas. For a complete analysis of the goals and provisions of the NGPA, see E.
SANDERS and S. WILLIAMS, both supra note 16.
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price controls on gas. 30 Within four years of passage of the NGPA, a gas
glut existed. 3' Prices naturally began to fall, and pipelines found that their
generous take-or-pay contracts were financially burdensome. Many pipe-
lines succeeded in renegotiating their contracts with producers, but others
failed to win concessions. Rather than pay the price of continuing to operate
under these burdensome contracts, those pipelines that had failed to win
concessions chose to repudiate the contracts and litigate their validity. 32
The following discussion outlines the primary issues raised in this litigation.
II. LEGAL SETTING OF THE TAKE-OR-PAY CONTROVERSY
Most take-or-pay litigation revolves around the numerous affirmative de-
fenses33 that pipelines have raised in an attempt to shield themselves from
liability.34 Most of the cases making their way to trial and resulting in pub-
lished opinions have focused on the excuse defenses of force majeure and
commercial impracticability. 35 This Comment addresses those defenses, fo-
cusing on the fundamental problem arising under contract excuse law: How
should a court allocate the risk of changed circumstances that affect a
party's ability to perform its take-or-pay obligations? This Comment shows
why the courts have consistently answered that question by rejecting the
force majeure and section 2-615 excuses and enforcing the take-or-pay con-
30. The partial deregulation provided by the NGPA spurred gas exploration and drilling
activity. At the same time, fuel-switching customers reacted to the increasing gas prices by
switching to alternative fuels, thereby reducing demand in the interstate gas market. Within a
short time, perhaps as early as 1982, the shortage turned into a surplus. In addition, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the regulatory body replacing the FPC,
launched a new plan that attempted to create an unregulated gas market. See S. WILLIAMS,
supra note 16, at 10.
31. The gas surplus prevented pipelines from marketing all the gas that they had under
contract. See id. at 13.
32. See Moody, supra note 16, § 6.06[3], at 6-19 ('[P]ipelines are caught between their
inability to market gas and their contract obligations to take-or-pay for gas. The ... pipeline
industry has responded.., by ... refusing to honor its take-or-pay contract obligations"); see
also Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, supra note 2, at 192 (arguing that pipelines chose to breach
their contracts and pay the expense of litigating them rather than continue to operate unprofit-
ably under the contracts).
33. See, e.g., Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 813 F.2d 77, 80
n.4 (5th Cir. 1987) (court noted defenses asserted at trial court but not raised on appeal, in-
cluding "frustration, mutual mistake, impossibility, illegality, unjust enrichment, and ... pen-
alty"); see also Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, supra note 2, at 212-52 (discussing full range of
generic defenses raised by pipelines, including force majeure, unconscionability, and commer-
cial impracticability).
34. See Medina, Take or Pay Oklahoma Style, 60 OKLA. B.J. 705 (1989).
35. As one article points out, much of the authority addressing the take-or-pay contro-
versy exists in unpublished slip opinions. Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, supra note 2, at 211.
For a partial list of these cases see supra notes 12-15. Another author argues that the force
majeure and commercial impracticability issues represent the primary contract issues to be
resolved in the force majeure clause controversy. See Moody, supra note 16, § 6.05. Published
opinions deciding force majeure or commercial impracticability issues in the take-or-pay con-
text include: Resources Inv. Corp. v. Enron Corp., 669 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Colo. 1987) (no
relief afforded under commercial impracticability doctrine of UCC § 2-615); Hanover Petro-
leum Corp. v. Tenneco, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1234 (La. App. 1988) (Louisiana law does not recog-
nize the common law doctrine of commercial impracticability); Golsen v. ONG W., Inc., 756




tracts according to their terms. This Comment also critiques several recent
decisions that contradict the consistent trend in take-or-pay cases and ap-
proach the risk allocation problem with little regard to its fundamental role
in excuse law. 36
A. Commercial Impracticability
1. Common Law
The doctrine of commercial impracticability is rooted in the English com-
mon law doctrine of impossibility. Under the early common law, English
courts refused to excuse a party to a contract when an event occurred subse-
quent to the making of the contract that affected one party's ability to per-
form.37 The courts required parties to perform absolutely, theorizing that
the parties were capable of allocating the risks of "any accident by inevitable
necessity."' 38 Perhaps because this rule caused harsh results, the courts be-
gan to recognize certain exceptions to its strict application. The emerging
exceptions became the law of "impossibility. '39
The common law recognized three exceptions to the general rule of abso-
lute performance. First, courts acknowledged that the death of a party to
the contract relieved his obligation to perform if performance required his
presence or action.4 0 Second, courts excused performance of the contract
when governmental action rendered the contemplated performance illegal. 4'
Originally this exception allowed the excuse only if the governmental action
took the form of a statutory prohibition of the performance, but courts sub-
sequently relaxed the rule to include acts of government that either modified
the nature of performance or imposed obligations upon performance that
rendered the performance impossible. 42 The celebrated case of Taylor v.
Caldwell 43 recognized the third exception, that the destruction of the subject
36. For a list of these recent decisions, see supra note 14. The relevance of this Comment
stems not only from the courts' willingness to depart from the precedential reasoning of earlier
take-or-pay decisions, but also from the courts' misapplication of the law of force majeure and
commercial impracticability. For good discussions of force majeure and commercial impracti-
cability, see Carney, The Nature and Extent of the Excuse Provided by a Force Majeure Event
Under a Coal Supply Agreement, 4 E. MIN. L. INST. § 11 (1984); Kirkham, Force Majeure-
Does It Really Work?, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 6 (1984); Marks & Martin, Minerals
Supply Contracts When the Market Goes South or North-Enforcement, Avoidance, and Rene-
gotiation, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 5 (1986) (arguing that inclusion of force majeure
provisions shows the need to go beyond remedies available under UCC § 2-615); Squillante &
Congalton, Force Majeure, 80 COM. L.J. 4 (1979) (discussing issues arising under UCC § 2-615
and case law interpretation of force majeure clauses).
37. See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897 (K.B. 1647).
38. Id.
39. Professor Farnsworth's treatise on contracts provides an excellent summary of all the
excuse doctrines, including mistake, impossibility, impracticability, and frustration. See E.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 9.1-.9 (1982).
40. See id. § 9.5, at 672.
41. Id. (citing Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911), which held that pas-
sage of federal law that prohibited common carriers from issuing free travel passes discharged
railroad's duty to honor such passes).
42. Id.
43. 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
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matter of the contract excused performance by the parties to the contract.
The theory underlying the excuse in Taylor v. Caldwell maintained that
although the contract did not provide for the contingency that occurred, its
occurrence rendered performance impossible and justified the court's impo-
sition of an implied term to the contract. 44
American courts have not been comfortable with the impossibility ex-
cuse, 45 but they have nonetheless reluctantly granted it. Generally, the
courts have limited its availability to circumstances similar to those in the
three traditional categories of impossibility in the common law.46 Over the
course of the scholarly and judicial debate surrounding this excuse, most
authorities recharacterized the impossibility excuse as the doctrine of im-
practicability of performance. 47
2. Section 2-615
The Uniform Commercial Code codifies the impracticability doctrine in
section 2-615.48 As with the common law principle of impossibility, the
UCC rationale rests on the theory that in some circumstances justice re-
quires that a court allocate the risks of performance that has become more
burdensome than originally contemplated and excuse performance under the
contract. 49 At first glance the provisions of section 2-615 appear straightfor-
ward, but many issues arise out of the general wording of the provision. The
44. Professor Farnsworth has labeled the rule announced in Taylor v. Caldwell the "foun-
tainhead of the modern law of impossibility." E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, § 9.5, at 673.
45. American courts have, however, generally recognized the excuse of frustration of pur-
pose. See id. § 9.7, at 690. The factors necessary to establish this excuse differ little from those
necessary to establish impossibility, but the party must show in addition that the occurrence of
the event has frustrated its principal purpose in entering the contract. See Lloyd v. Murphy,
25 Cal. 48, 153 P.2d 47, 52 (1944) (Traynor, J.); Valencia Center, Inc. v. Publix Super Mkts.,
Inc., 464 So. 2d 1267, 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Scullin Steel Co. v. Paccar, Inc., 708
S.W.2d 756, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Co. v. Stoneway Concrete,
Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 558, 637 P.2d 647, 650 (1981).
46. The three categories consist of (1) death of the promisor, (2) illegality of performance,
and (3) destruction of subject matter. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, § 9.5; see also 407
E. 61st Garage, Inc. v. Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 275, 244 N.E.2d 37, 41 (1968)
("excuse of impossibility of performance is limited to the destruction of the means of perform-
ance by an act of God, vis major, or by law" (emphasis in original)).
47. Professor Farnsworth notes that both the first and second Restatements of Contracts
use the term "impracticability" and that Williston, in his original treatise, referred to the im-
possibility doctrine as excusing a party when performance had become "impracticable in a
business sense." See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, § 9.6, at 679 n.12. The California
Supreme Court in Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458, 460 (1916),
stated that "[a] thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable" (quoting I
BEACH ON CONTRACT § 216 (1897)). Expanding on this notion, Judge Skelly Wright, in
Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966), noted that
"the concept of impracticability assumes performance was physically possible." The notion
that performance could be physically possible yet unenforceable contradicts the underlying
reasoning of the early common law exceptions, but courts apparently have not required strict
impossibility since the relaxation of the rule in Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, § 9.6, at
679 n.12.
48. For the relevant text of § 2-615, see supra note 2.
49. See United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1966); E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, § 9.6, at 678.
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following discussion outlines the elements required to excuse performance
under section 2-615 and addresses the issues arising under its provisions.
Section 2-615 contains four elements: (1) the occurrence of an event must
render performance as agreed impracticable; (2) the nonoccurrence of the
event must have been a basic assumption of the contract; (3) the event must
not have occurred due to the fault of the party claiming the excuse;50 and
(4) the party seeking the excuse must not have agreed to assume a greater
obligation. 51 Several issues arise in the application of these elements. First,
under what circumstances will a court find performance impracticable? 52
a. Impracticability. The few cases that have allowed the commercial im-
practicability excuse of section 2-615 have done so on the same rationale that
the early common law courts granted the impossibility excuse.53 In Asphalt
International, Inc. v. Enterprise Shipping Corp.,54 for example, a ship char-
terer brought suit against the owner of the vessel for breach of the charter
agreement, claiming that the owner failed to repair the ship in accordance
with the charter contract. The ship had been loading cargo at a pier when
another vessel rammed her amidship, inflicting substantial damage. The
cost of repairing the vessel significantly exceeded the value of the ship. The
owner defended its failure to repair the vessel by claiming an excuse under
section 2-615.55 Recognizing that section 2-615 applied exclusively to the
sale of goods, the court nevertheless applied the principles of that section to
excuse the owner.56 Because requiring the owner to repair "would require a
type of performance essentially different from that for which Asphalt con-
tracted," the Second Circuit ruled that the complete destruction of the vessel
rendered the owner's contractual duty to repair commercially
impracticable.5 7
In Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Engineers, Inc.58 a prime contractor
sued one of its subcontractors for breach of an agreement to supply specially
engineered equipment for use in a sewage treatment plant. The contract
50. Because most cases raising § 2-615 issues do not address this third element, this Com-
ment does not elaborate on it.
51. U.C.C. § 2-615. Courts differ on the number of elements that comprise the excuse
afforded in § 2-615. Compare In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517
F. Supp. 440, 451 (E.D. Va. 1981) (claims of commercial impracticability raise four issues:(1) impracticability, (2) foreseeability, (3) basic assumption, (4) risk allocation) with Iowa Elec.
Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 134 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (§ 2-615 requires
proof of three elements: (1) whether the risk of an unforeseen contingency was assumed,(2) basic assumption, (3) impracticability).
52. Few defendants have successfully raised the impracticability defense, thus little au-
thority exists to fully describe what constitutes impracticability. As stated infra note 62 and
accompanying text, however, much authority exists to describe what does not constitute
impracticability.
53. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
54. 667 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1981).
55. Id. at 266.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
discussed infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text).
58. 775 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1985).
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listed several restrictive specifications for the equipment under the contract.
The subcontractor supplied equipment that met the performance require-
ments issued by the Environmental Protection Agency but that did not
strictly comply with the engineering specifications listed in the contract. In
defending the suit the subcontractor raised the impracticability defense of
section 2-615, arguing that it had relied on the EPA rules prohibiting the
type of restrictive specifications found in the contract and claiming that if it
had complied with the restrictive specifications, its machine would not have
performed in accordance with the government rules. 59 The Second Circuit
agreed with the subcontractor and excused its nonperformance under the
contract. The court stated that the subcontractor's "inability to supply a
filter press that would both satisfy [plaintiff's] mechanical specifications and
perform as required [by the EPA] is sufficient to establish that performance
of its contract with [the plaintiff] was commercially impracticable." 60
The reasoning of both of the above decisions parallels the reasoning un-
derlying the exceptions to the absolute performance rule of the early com-
mon law. In Asphalt International, Inc. the court excused the owner of the
vessel because the subject matter of the contract had essentially been de-
stroyed. In Waldinger Corp. the court excused the subcontractor because
federal law prevented performance in accordance with the terms of the con-
tract. Although neither decision discussed the common law exception that it
implicitly incorporated, this omission is not surprising; the UCC supplied
the tools necessary for the court to allocate the risks arising from each occur-
rence. These decisions are important because they reveal the similarity of
the common law impossibility excuse and the section 2-615 excuse. The de-
cisions bolster the argument that the two excuses are the same.
61
While the occurrence of an event that falls within the three categories of
common law impossibility appears to place a party under the protection of
section 2-615, some limits exist. Nearly all courts agree that an event that
merely renders performance more expensive or less profitable will not oper-
ate to excuse a party.62 During the Middle-East crisis that closed the Suez
Canal in the late 1950s, for example, many shippers had to reroute around
the Cape of Good Hope. The operator of the ship in Transatlantic Financing
Corp. v. United States63 sought to recover the extra costs attendant with its
diversion around the Cape. The operator argued that the closure of the ca-
nal rendered the contemplated performance impossible and that the ship's
59. Id. at 784-86.
60. Id. at 789.
61. Commentators disagree on whether the impossibility excuse and the § 2-615 excuse
differ. Compare Tannenbaum, supra note 17, at 783 ("the Code intended to adopt a more
lenient standard for discharge") with E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, § 9.6, at 677 ("The
common law development ... is synthesized in UCC 2-615").
62. See Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., Inc., 122 Ill. App. 3d 940, 461 N.E.2d
1049, 1061 (1984); Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1976); see
also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, § 9.6, at 680 n.18 (citing numerous cases and articles
discussing additional expense in light of § 2-615).
63. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966). This case was one of the first federal appellate deci-
sions to address specifically the newly enacted § 2-615. See also United States v. Wegematic
Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966) (another early major case to address § 2-615 issues).
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subsequent voyage around the Cape conferred a benefit for which the opera-
tor should recover. 64 In a well-reasoned opinion that characterized the com-
mercial impracticability doctrine of section 2-615 as representing "the ever-
shifting line.., at which the community's interest in having contracts en-
forced according to their terms is outweighed by the commercial senseless-
ness of requiring performance, ' 65 Judge Skelly Wright rejected the
operator's claim of impracticability. Judge Wright concluded, in essence,
that the disparity between the expected cost under the contract and the ac-
tual cost of the diverted voyage was not great enough to render the required
performance impracticable. 66
The application of the impracticability doctrine to long-term contracts
provides particularly helpful insight into the problems faced in the take-or-
pay context. In Missouri Public Service Co. v. Peabody Coal Co. 67 a utility
sought to require a coal company to perform its obligations under a long-
term coal supply agreement. The coal company had informed the utility of
its intention not to perform in the face of potential financial losses and ar-
gued that section 2-615 excused its obligation to supply coal at a financial
loss. The court affirmed a lower court decree of specific performance, find-
ing that the mere fact that the coal company made a bad bargain under
which it might suffer financial loss did not render its performance commer-
cially impracticable. 68
One might expect that a court would be more likely to grant a section 2-
615 excuse to a party that cannot economically perform a long-term con-
tract, because the length of time over which the party must continue to per-
form unprofitably magnifies the party's hardship.69 The Peabody Coal Co.
decision fairly reflects the disagreement that most courts have with that
view: courts typically view the long-term contract as the method chosen by
the parties to allocate the large economic risks of a transaction, and the
courts simply will not disturb that allocation. 70
64. Transatlantic Fin. Corp., 363 F.2d at 315.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 319 (quoting § 2-615 comment 4: "Increased cost alone does not excuse per-
formance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essen-
tial nature of the performance.").
67. 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
68. Id. at 728.
69. One famous decision indicates that increased cost may suffice to excuse a party to a
long-term contract. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 78
(W.D. Pa. 1980). Although Judge Teitelbaum's decision in this case represents one of the most
scholarly and succinct reviews of the law of excuse, his decision to reform the contract and
allocate the burdens fairly among the parties has prevented the opinion from becoming the
deserved foundation from which all analyses of § 2-615 derive.
70. See, e.g., Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 278
(7th Cir. 1986) (purpose of long-term fixed price contracts is to allocate risks attendant with
modern economy; fluctuations in that economy cannot serve as excuse to "allow the buyer to
walk away from the contract"); Northern I11. Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., Inc., 122 I11. App. 3d
940, 461 N.E.2d 1049, 1061 (1984) (long-term fixed price supply contracts allocate the risk of a
fall in prices to buyer, and court will not alter that allocation). The comments to § 2-615 state
that market fluctuations are "exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made
at fixed prices are intended to cover." U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 4 (1987).
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This aspect of the section 2-615 excuse applies particularly to take-or-pay
litigation. Most pipelines defend take-or-pay suits by claiming that the fall
of natural gas prices renders their contractual obligations commercially im-
practicable to perform. 71 Courts have summarily rejected the pipelines'
claims, using reasoning similar to that in Peabody Coal Co. 72
Despite the seemingly clear conclusion that economic hardship does not
render performance commercially impracticable, some uncertainty still ex-
ists about the role that the economic well-being of a party plays in the im-
practicability analysis. This uncertainty stems, in part, from the language of
the comments to section 2-615. 73 Comment 4 states that "[i]ncreased cost
alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some
unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the perform-
ance. ' '74 This language intimates that section 2-615 may operate to excuse a
party if that party would suffer such economic hardship in performing its
contract that by forcing it to perform a court would be effectively writing a
new contract for it.75
This theory finds support in a pre-UCC case that was among the first to
enunciate the impracticability doctrine. In Mineral Park Land Co. v. How-
ard76 the California Supreme Court excused a party from its contractual
obligation because the party could have further performed under the con-
tract only at a "prohibitive cost ... of 10 or 12 times as much as the usual
cost."' 77 The holding has proved to be a lasting part of American jurispru-
dence. Many defendants have relied on the California Supreme Court's rec-
ognition of the role that profit and expenses play in the impracticability
analysis. Courts, while most often rejecting the excuse when sought on fi-
nancial grounds, have had at least to acknowledge that such financial consid-
erations play a role in the impracticability analysis. 78  While most
71. See Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, supra note 2, at 233.
72. See Superior Oil Co. v. Transco Energy Co., 616 F. Supp. 98, 109 (W.D. La. 1985);
Challenger Minerals, Inc. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., No. 84-C-357-E, slip op. at 14-15
(N.D. Okla. Sept. 9, 1986), withdrawn as settled (Nov. 26, 1986); Thomas N. Berry & Co. v.
Northern Natural Gas Co., CIV-85-1430-R (W.D. Okla. May 13, 1986); Reading & Bates
Petroleum Co. v. Transok, Inc., No. CJ-85-1992, slip op. at 11 (Tulsa Cty. Dist. Ct., Okla. Jan.
27, 1987), withdrawn as settled (March 18, 1987); Lone Star Gas Co. v. McCarthy, 605 S.W.2d
653, 656-57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. Although the UCC comments do not bind a court in its interpretation of the statute
unless the legislature has adopted them as an expression of the meaning of the statute, many
courts rely on them as evidence of the intent of the drafters of a particular section. Interna-
tional Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879, 885 n.2 (10th Cir. 1985).
74. U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 4 (1988) (emphasis added).
75. Indeed, Judge Skelly Wright acknowledged in Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United
States, 363 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1966), that "it may be an overstatement to say that in-
creased cost ... of performance never constitute[s] impracticability."
76. 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).
77. 156 P. at 459.
78. See Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 278 (7th
Cir. 1986); Bernina Distribs., Inc. v, Bernina Sewing Mach. Co., 646 F.2d 434, 439 (10th Cir.
1981); American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir.
1972); Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Printing
Indus. Ass'n v. International Printing & Graphic Communications Union, 584 F. Supp. 990,
1000-01 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 72
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contractual relationships still fall within the standards applied by the
Peabody Coal Co. court, 7 9 the specter of a relaxed view towards impractica-
bility due to economic hardship looms in the background.
8 0
b. Basic Assumption. A party seeking the section 2-615 excuse must
show that the nonoccurrence of the contingency was a "basic assumption" of
the contract.8 ' Professor Farnsworth argues that the three fundamental ex-
ceptions to the common law rule of absolute performance8 2 represent the
primary categories of basic assumptions. s 3 Parties presume that they will be
alive long enough to perform the contract, that the performance will remain
legal, and that the incidents necessary for performance will remain in exist-
ence. Courts, however, approach the basic assumption issue by examining
the foreseeability of the event in question.8 4 Courts generally view the oc-
currence of a foreseeable contingency as a basic assumption of the contract,
and they deny an excuse based on such a contingency on the presumption
that the burdened party implicitly agreed to bear the risk occasioned by the
event. 85
In Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Energy Cooperative, Inc.,8 6 for example, a
purchaser of chemical feedstock entered into a long-term take-or-pay con-
tract at a specified price. When the price of alternative fuels fell below the
contract price of the chemical feedstock, the purchaser sought to abandon its
performance by claiming that the shifts in the energy economy rendered per-
formance commercially impracticable. The court denied the excuse, reason-
ing that adverse shifts in the energy economy were foreseeable and that the
purchaser assumed the risk of the occurrence of those adverse shifts when it
entered into the take-or-pay contract.8 7 The reason for the court's refusal to
find that the complained of contingency was unforeseeable was simple. The
court could not employ section 2-615 to allocate the risk of the contingency
(W.D. Pa. 1980); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 136 (N.D.
Iowa 1978).
79. See supra notes 67-68.
80. One academic favors a more relaxed view towards granting the excuse on financial
grounds. He argues that the courts have too strictly applied § 2-615 to cases where granting
the excuse appears the just result. Murray, Long-Term Supply Contracts: Foreseeing the Un-
foreseeable, 2 E. MIN. L. INST. § 2, § 2.02(7) (1981) (arguing that courts have been too preoc-
cupied with "the sanctity of contract" to achieve a just resolution of the dispute where one
party suffers from a dramatic change in market conditions).
81. See supra text accompanying note 50.
82. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
83. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, § 9.6, at 683 n.28.
84. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 134 (N.D. Iowa
1978); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 441 (S.D. Fla. 1975);
Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., Inc., 122 Ill. App. 3d 940, 461 N.E.2d 1049, 1060
(1984). The comments to § 2-615 indicate that the relevant inquiry is whether the "contin-
gency in question is sufficiently foreshadowed." U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 8 (1987). Although
the term "foreseeability" may have lost its relevance for the purposes of UCC analysis, this
Comment employs it because the courts continue to use it.
85. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 992 (5th Cir.
1976).
86. 122 Ill. App. 3d 940, 461 N.E.2d 1049 (1984).
87. 461 N.E.2d at 1060.
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because the parties had already allocated that risk in the contract. 88 By allo-
cating that risk the parties revealed that they foresaw the contingency and
sought to avoid it.
c. Assumption of Greater Obligation. The excuse under section 2-615 is
not available to a party if it has assumed a greater risk under the contract. 89
In most circumstances this analysis must rely on specific contract terms that
allocate to one party or the other the risk that performance will become
more difficult. 90 This analysis is essentially a mirror image of the foresee-
ability analysis above: If the contract terms indicate that a risk was foresee-
able, the court will deny the excuse sought by the nonperforming party.
When a party assumes a greater obligation under the contract, it indicates
which foreseeable risks it is willing to assume.
The court's decision in Bernina Distributors, Inc. v. Bernina Sewing
Machine Co.91 reflects this reasoning. An importer sought the impracticabil-
ity excuse because fluctuating exchange rates had eroded its profit margin.
The contract provision at issue allowed the importer to raise the price of the
machines it sold to American distributors only to the extent that the price of
the machines purchased by the importer increased. The importer desired to
add a surcharge to the price it charged the American distributors in order to
recoup the profit lost to the fluctuating exchange rates. In denying the ex-
cuse, the court reasoned that because the contract limited price increases to
a specified type, the importer had assumed the risk that fluctuating exchange
rates would reduce its profit.9 2 As support for its conclusion the court
pointed to the fact that the importer had "clear foreknowledge of the possi-
bility of currency fluctuations." '93
The element of section 2-615 that a party not assume a greater obligation
under the contract is particularly applicable to take-or-pay contracts. In a
take-or-pay contract a pipeline agrees to take gas, or if it does not take gas,
to pay for a minimum amount of gas anyway. The court's formulation in
Bernina indicates that if a pipeline has specifically contracted with regard to
its ability to take or pay for gas, thus indicating that even if it does not need
88. The take-or-pay provision was designed to protect the buyer from shortages of supply
and to insulate the seller from price fluctuations. See id. at 1061.
89. The excuse afforded under § 2-615 applies "[e]xcept so far as a seller has assumed a
greater obligation." See supra note 3. Courts have occasionally questioned whether, in light of
the specific mention of sellers, § 2-615 applies at all to buyers. See Nora Springs Coop. Co. v.
Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1976). Most courts, however, have determined that § 2-
615 does apply to buyers. See, e.g., International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770
F.2d 879 (1985) (reversing lower court determination that § 2-615 does not apply to buyers),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co.,
799 F.2d 265, 277 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing whether Indiana applies § 2-615 to buyers);
Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 108 Idaho 892, 894, 702 P.2d 930, 932 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1985) (concluding that § 2-615 applies to buyers). The courts addressing this issue rely
on comment nine, which states that in certain circumstances "the reason of the present section
may well apply and entitle the buyer to the [excuse]." U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 9 (1987).
90. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, § 9.6, at 683 n.36.
91. 646 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1981).




the gas it is willing to pay for it, then the pipeline cannot claim impractica-
bility because subsequent events have altered its ability to take the gas.94
Indeed, the court in Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Energy Cooperative, Inc.95
followed that reasoning and concluded that because the purchaser had en-
tered a take-or-pay contract, it had guaranteed its performance without re-
gard to whether it actually needed the chemical feedstock.96
The question of whether one party has assumed a greater obligation under
the contract focuses the excuse analysis on the root issue of risk allocation.
The court denied the section 2-615 excuse to the importer in Bernina be-
cause the importer had agreed in the contract to bear the burden of fluctuat-
ing exchange rates. Similarly, the court in Northern Illinois Gas Co. refused
to excuse the purchaser because the purchaser had explicitly bargained for
the risk that subsequently made the contract unprofitable. 97 Long-term sup-
ply contracts are not the only means by which the parties allocate risk. The
following discussion shows how a force majeure clause operates as a method
of risk allocation. The discussion reveals the distinction between the section
2-615 excuse and the force majeure excuse and shows why the two excuses
are mutually exclusive.
B. Force Majeure
A force majeure clause excuses a party on the happening of a force
majeure event. 98 Parties include force majeure clauses in their contracts be-
cause they wish to limit the risk that a future event will prevent them from
performing the contract and subject them to liability on the unperformed
obligation.9 9 The following discussion focuses on three important limita-
tions that courts place on the force majeure excuse.
94. This is not to say that the pipeline cannot claim that its ability to pay has become
commercially impracticable. As shown above, however, the courts are very unlikely to grant
the § 2-615 excuse because performance has become unprofitable. See supra note 68 and ac-
companying text.
95. 461 N.E.2d 1049, 1060 (1984). For the facts of this case, see supra text accompanying
note 86.
96. The purchaser had assumed an obligation to pay for the product even if subsequent
events rendered its ability to take the product impracticable, or even impossible. 461 N.E.2d
at 1060-61.
97. Most businessmen would probably acknowledge that commercial contracts involve
trade-offs and compromises. One party agrees to accept some risk in order to achieve a poten-
tial benefit. The UCC recognizes that businessmen constantly take such calculated risks, and
§ 2-615 embodies the policy that the law should not, under most circumstances, alter the
choices that the businessmen make. See U.C.C. comment 8 (1987) (commercial contracts
contain a choice of risks as part of the "dickered terms").
98. See supra note 4 for a typical force majeure provision. It is dangerous to generalize
about contract provisions that invariably differ between any two contracting parties. This
Comment, while bearing in mind that danger, attempts to develop a generalized discussion of
the judicial treatment of force majeure clauses, focusing particularly on their scope and
application.
99. See Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
79 CoM. L.J. 75, 76 (1974). Parties to a contract include force majeure clauses primarily to
allocate the risk of the future occurrence of some event that would render one of them unable
to comply with its contractual obligations. See Kirkham, supra note 36, § 6.02[2] ("purpose of
the force majeure concept in legal relationships is to provide an established legal standard by




While the definition of a force majeure event varies depending on the sub-
ject matter of the contract, virtually all clauses include as a definition of a
force majeure event any occurrence beyond the reasonable control of the
parties. 100 The first limitation on the excuse under a force majeure clause is
the scope of this catch-all language. A party often asks the court to grant
the force majeure excuse because an event that the force majeure clause does
not list but that allegedly falls within the catch-all provision of the clause has
occurred and has adversely affected the party's ability to perform. Under
the doctrine of ejusdem generist 01 courts have denied the claimed excuse
unless the allegedly excusing event is similar to or of the same nature as the
events specifically listed in the force majeure clause.
In Langham-Hill Petroleum, Inc. v. Southern Fuels Co., 10 2 for example,
the court denied the force majeure excuse sought by a crude oil purchaser.
The purchaser claimed that the Saudi Arabian effort to regain market share
by flooding the market with crude oil and causing a dramatic fall in world
oil prices prevented the purchaser from economically performing the con-
tract. The court rejected the purchaser's claim and held that the alleged
contingency did not constitute a force majeure event that triggered the ex-
cusing provision. 10 3 The court reasoned that if "fixed-price contracts can be
avoided due to fluctuations in price, then the entire purpose of fixed-price
contracts, which is to protect both the buyer and the seller from the risks of
the market, is defeated. ' 1°4
.Indeed, in virtually all decisions addressing force majeure claims based on
an inability to make a profit because of some cause beyond a party's control,
courts have rejected the application of the catch-all provision to excuse the
party from its contractual obligation. 10 5 The cases that reject the force
majeure excuse based on adverse economic events reflect the courts' ten-
dency both to construe the provisions of a force majeure clause narrowly and
supra note 36, § 5.04(3)(b) ("force majeure clause is ... an attempt to exclude risks that are
not being assumed").
100. Indeed, the notion of force majeure arose originally to address those occurrences, such
as acts of God, that humans had no power to control. See supra note 4.
101. Ejusdern generis is a rule of contract interpretation that limits application of general
terms that follow specific terms to the same type or character as the specific terms. See Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 988 (5th Cir. 1976); Bumpus v.
United States, 325 F.2d 264, 266-67 (10th Cir. 1963).
102. 813 F.2d 1327, 1329-30 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 99 (1987).
103. 813 F.2d at 1329-30.
104. Id. at 1330.
105. E.g., Lanham-Hill Petroleum, Inc. v. Southern Fuels Co., 813 F.2d 1327, 1329-30 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 99 (1987) (rejecting force majeure defense and holding that world
oil price shock, although financially harmful, did not prevent performance under contract);
Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. v. Cabron County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 275 (7th Cir. 1986) (re-
jecting force majeure defense and holding that utility company's inability to pass fuel costs to
consumers did not prevent utility company from complying with its contractual obligations);
Northern I11. Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., Inc., 122 Ill. App. 3d 940, 461 N.E.2d 1049, 1057
(1984) (public utility commission denial of requested rate increase did not constitute force




to require that the clause state with particularity the events that will operate
to excuse a party.' 0 6 The cases also reveal how the courts construe the par-
ties' agreed-upon allocation of risk. In Langham-Hill Petroleum, Inc., for
instance, the court essentially concluded that because the force majeure
clause made no mention of adverse economic or market events, the contract
had not removed that risk from the purchaser.,0 7
2. Causation of Event by Nonperforming Party
The second limitation on the force majeure excuse conditions the availa-
bility of the excuse on the behavior of the party claiming the excuse. Gener-
ally, courts require that the party claiming the force majeure excuse show
that it did not cause the event that prevents its performance. 0 8 The ration-
ale underlying this requirement is sound. Not only does this requirement
recognize the explicit language of most force majeure clauses, it also pre-
vents a promisor from evading its obligations by causing a force majeure
event.
At least one court requires an additional showing that the party alleging
the excusing event must prove that it took reasonable steps to prevent the
occurrence of the excusing event.109 Although less obvious, the rationale
underlying this requirement is also sound. If the primary purpose of the
force majeure clause is to aid a party when some event prevents its perform-
ance, the ability of the party to forestall the occurrence of the excusing event
suggests that the event by itself did not really prevent the party's
performance. 110
106. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440, 459
(E.D. Va. 1981) (U.S. government's failure to authorize construction of nuclear fuel deposito-
ries and its action rendering illegal the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel did not constitute
force majeure event that prevented fuel supplier from performing its obligation to remove
spent nuclear fuel from reactor site); Golsen v. ONG W., Inc., 756 P.2d 1209, 1212-14 (Okla.
1988) (failure of demand for natural gas under take-or-pay contract did not constitute force
majeure event preventing pipeline from making payments under the terms of the contract;
"[s]uspension of the obligation.., in the event of a partial failure of the market is contrary to
the general purpose of the contract, and ... would transform the contract to another creature
entirely"); Troxell v. Beacon Coal Co., 50 Pa. D. & C. 128, 131 (1943) (inability to market coal
under take-or-pay contract does not constitute a force majeure event over which operator had
no control); Hawkland, supra note 99, at 76.
107. See 813 F.2d at 1329 n.l (text of force majeure clause), 1330.
108. See United States v. Brooks-Callaway Co., 318 U.S. 120, 123 (1943) (reversing Court
of Claims decision excusing a party for occurrence of force majeure event that was within
control of the party); Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 1530, 1540
(5th Cir. 1984) (determining application of California law on question of reasonable control).
109. See Oosten v. Hay Haulers Dairy Employees & Helpers Union, 45 Cal. 2d 784, 291
P.2d 17, 20-21 (1955); see also 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1342 (1962) (and cases cited
therein).
110. The next logical question is whether a party must also show that it could have reason-
ably prevented the effect of the excusing event, regardless of whether or not the party could
have prevented the event itself. The authorities do not explore this question, perhaps because
it implicitly raises the same issue addressed by the court in Oosten: Ifa party could prevent the
effect of the excusing event, but did not, the scope of the party's duty would be measured by
the same rule as when the party could have prevented the occurrence of the event itself, but did
not. The tendency of this rule is to import into the force majeure provision a standard of good
faith on the part of the party claiming the excuse. That is, a party must exercise good faith to
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Most of the cases addressing this "reasonable control" issue involve a
party seeking an excuse for some event not specifically listed in the force
majeure clause.' 1' The party usually claims that the event falls within the
catch-all provision that purports to include all events beyond the party's
control. 112 Occasionally, however, the party seeks an excuse based upon the
occurrence of a specifically listed event. The question thus arises whether a
party must satisfy the reasonable control rule in establishing a force majeure
defense based on a specifically listed event rather than on the catch-all provi-
sion. Courts have clearly answered that question in the affirmative, holding
generally that the reasonable control language modifies each event listed in
the clause.' 13 Thus, a party seeking a force majeure excuse may not act so
that the event occurs in response to the action, and, likewise, the party may
not stand idly by and let an event occur when it could have prevented the
event's occurrence through its own reasonable efforts.
3. Excusing Event Must Prevent Performance
In addition to the above two limitations, courts have imposed a strict cau-
sality requirement between the occurrence of the event and the claimed ex-
cuse. 11 4 As a general rule a party claiming a force majeure excuse must
demonstrate that the allegedly excusing event actually prevented perform-
ance. 115 In Wheeling Valley Coal Corp. v. Mead,' 16 for example, a bank-
ensure performance. Oosten, 291 P.2d at 21; see Butler v. Nepple, 54 Cal. 2d 589, 354 P.2d
239, 244 (1960). Although this requirement potentially alters the elements necessary to estab-
lish a force majeure event, little authority exists outside of California to indicate that it is a
general rule of construction applicable to force majeure clauses.
11. See supra note 107.
112. Courts, however, rarely grant the excuse based upon a force majeure that does not fall
within the particular listing of events in the clause. See supra text accompanying note 100.
113. See Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 1530, 1541 (5th Cir.
1984); see also United States v. Brooks-Callaway Co., 318 U.S. 120, 123 (1943) (adjective
"unforeseeable," when used to describe type of event that would excuse a party, modifies each
event listed in clause).
114. Many cases from the beginning of this century illustrate this point. E.g. Swift & Co.
v. Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 17 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1927) (under contract with electric
company containing force majeure clause that excused cotton seed mill on occurrence of cer-
tain events preventing mill from receiving a minimum amount of electricity, cotton crop
shortage did not excuse mill from obligation because shortage was not the cause of failure of
mill to perform); Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Solleveld, 11 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1926)
(in order for governmental restraint to excuse performance under force majeure clause of char-
ter agreement, restraint must cause failure to perform agreement); Kempner v. Goddard Gro-
cer Co., 5 F.2d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 1925) (engine trouble at sugar refinery preventing seller from
delivering sugar under contract did not suffice under force majeure provision to excuse nonde-
livery because seller did not show that engine failure in fact prevented delivery of sugar).
115. In his contracts treatise Williston writes:
It has become common for manufacturers and others to insert in their contracts
clauses relieving them from liability in case of strikes and other unforeseen casu-
alties .... [W]hile such agreements are legal, it is essential to prove that a strike
or casualty comprehended within the terms of the clause in question was the
actual cause of nonperformance.
3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1968 (1920) (emphasis added). Professor Hawkland agrees
and argues that the requirement that the cause actually prevent performance represents a fun-
damental limitation on the excuse, erected by courts through their skeptical approach to ex-
cuses for nonperformance. See Hawkland, supra note 99, at 76 nn.6-9.
116. 186 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1950).
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ruptcy trustee of a mining company entered into a contract with the lessee of
a mine. The contract provided for a minimum payment of royalties by the
trustee to the lessee and included a force majeure provision that excused
payment of the minimum royalty upon the happening of certain events, in-
cluding interruption of mining due to governmental acts. Shortly after exe-
cution of the contract, the government enacted regulations that increased the
cost of labor in the mines and limited the price that the trustee could charge
for the coal. The lessee brought suit to recover arrearage in the payment of
the minimum royalty, and the trustee defended by claiming that the govern-
mental acts excused its performance under the force majeure clause. 1 7 The
court rejected the force majeure defense, concluding that the financial insol-
vency of the operator was the actual cause for the nonperformance of the
minimum payment obligation."18 The court cited numerous cases in support
of its reasoning that the allegedly excusing event must be "the actual cause
of nonperformance."' 1 9
III. ANALYSIS
The above discussion reveals the fundamental distinction between the
force majeure excuse and the section 2-615 excuse. The force majeure ex-
cuse arises directly from the contract between the parties and represents
their agreement about how to allocate the risks of future adverse events.' 20
The section 2-615 excuse, on the other hand, arises from the statutory deter-
mination that because the parties did not allocate a particular risk, the court
should perform that task for them by excusing a party. Section 2-615 em-
bodies the policy that, when egregious and unforeseen circumstances exist,
fairness dictates that the court excuse the burdened party. 12 1 A court should
not combine the two excuses because the analyses underlying the excuses
differ. Under section 2-615 a party does not have to show that it cannot
perform its contract; rather, the party need only show that its performance
differs markedly from what it originally contemplated. 122 Under a force
majeure clause, however, the party must show that it cannot perform the
contract at all because a particular event has actually prevented perform-
ance. 123 Each excuse requires different proof regarding the effect of the com-
plained of event. To grant a force majeure excuse upon a showing that the
party could perform, but could perform only impracticably, confounds the
analysis of the force majeure excuse. The following discussion critiques sev-
eral recent decisions that have undertaken such a confused analysis.
In International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc.124 the court
117. Id. at 221.
118. Id. at 223.
119. Id. (quoting 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1968 (1920)).
120. See supra note 98.
121. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Recall that increased cost does not make
performance markedly different. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 114.
124. 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985).
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ignored the above distinction and concluded, without considering the impli-
cations of its decision, that the analysis required under section 2-615 applied
to the analysis of the force majeure excuse.' 2 5 In this case an industrial
buyer of natural gas entered into a take-or-pay contract with a producer to
supply natural gas to the buyer's potash processing facility. The processing
plant consisted of nine gas-fired boilers that the buyer used to manufacture
fertilizer. At the time the parties entered into the contract, the emissions
from the processing plant were not subject to environmental regulation. Six
years later, however, the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Board
promulgated a rule that severely limited the emissions allowed from the
buyer's processing plant. The buyer attempted to reduce its pollution by
various means, but it could not come within the limits specified by the regu-
latory board if it continued to use the gas-fired boilers. The buyer therefore
shut down its boilers and consequently failed to take the minimum amount
of gas under its contract with the producer.
The buyer sought a declaratory judgment, claiming that its action in com-
plying with the environmental order excused its obligation under two force
majeure provisions in the contract 26 to take or pay for the natural gas. The
court analyzed the two force majeure provisions separately, recognizing that
the case fundamentally presented a problem of contract construction.
27
The court had no difficulty construing the terms of the first generic force
majeure provision.' 28 It rejected the argument that the buyer's required
compliance with the environmental order excused both its duty to take and
to pay for the natural gas:
[E]ven if we assume . . . that [the order] prevented [the buyer] from
taking the gas, [the order] would still pose no obstacle to [the buyer's]
ability to pay. Since this is a "take or pay" contract, the buyer can
perform in either of two ways. It can either (1) take the minimum
purchase obligation of natural gas.., or (2) pay the minimum bill. It is
settled law that when a promisor can perform a contract in either of two
alternative ways, the impracticability of one alternative does not excuse
the promisor if performance by means of the other alternative is still
125. Id. at 886.
126. The pertinent parts of the two provisions stated:
15. FORCE MAJEURE: Either party shall be excused for delay or failure
to perform its agreements and undertakings . . . when and to the extent that
such failure or delay is occasioned by fire, flood, wind, lightning, or other acts of
the elements, explosion, act of God, act of the public enemy, or interference of
civil and/or military authorities ... or other casualty or cause beyond the rea-
sonable control of the parties, respectively, which delays or prevents such per-
formance in whole or in part ....
16. ADJUSTMENT OF MINIMUM BILL: In the event that Seller is un-
able to deliver or Buyer is unable to receive gas as provided in this Contract for
any reason beyond the reasonable control of the parties, or in the event of force
majeure as provided in Section 15 hereof, an appropriate adjustment in the mini-
mum purchase requirements ... shall be made.
Id. at 882. The minimum purchase requirements provision provided that the buyer would take
or pay for a minimum amount of gas during each calendar year. Id.
127. Id. at 884.




The court concluded that the first force majeure provision could at most
excuse only the buyer's duty to take the gas but could not excuse its duty to
pay for gas not taken under the contract.130
The court struggled with the construction of the second force majeure
provision, which provided for adjustments to the minimum purchase obliga-
tion.131 The court noted that in order for the buyer to succeed on its claim
of excuse under the second force majeure clause, the environmental order
must have rendered the buyer unable to receive gas under the terms of the
contract. 132 The court then construed the word "unable" as "synonymous
with 'impracticable,' as that term is used in . . . Section 2-615." 13 3 The
court reasoned that in the literal sense of the second force majeure provision,
the buyer would never be unable to take the gas because it "could always
take the gas and vent it into the air."' 134 Rather than read such a "simplis-
tic" meaning in the terms of the force majeure clause, the court chose to
construe "unable" according to the way that businessmen and attorneys pre-
sumably would construe it, that is, as impracticable. 135 In other words, the
court imported into the force majeure provision the excusing burden of sec-
tion 2-615 rather than construing the clause to require that the contingency
actually prevent performance.136
The Llano decision has a major fault. The court claimed to be construing
the second force majeure provision according to commercial standards that
were recognized as inherent parts of the common law by businessmen and
attorneys, but the court missed a step in its logic. It bypassed any discussion
of the common law, which should have applied since the parties by agree-
ment went outside the UCC, and instead moved headlong into a discussion
of the UCC, adopting the impracticability standard as the representative
standard of force majeure clause construction. In this analysis the court dis-
carded a well-established judicial practice of requiring that a claimed force
majeure event actually prevent performance in order to excuse the party
raising the force majeure defense. Perhaps the error can in part be explained
by the fact that the court never explicitly recognized the so-called minimum
bill provision as a force majeure clause. 137 The language of the minimum
129. 770 F.2d at 885.
130. Id.
131. For the text of the second force majeure clause, paragraph 16, see supra note 126.
132. 770 F.2d at 886.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The court stated that under the common law of New Mexico the term "unable" in a
contract means impracticable. Id. The court, however, cites no authority for this conclusion,
and, in addition, fails to note that the common law has traditionally construed the excuse
language of a force majeure clause, whether couched as "prevented from" or "rendered un-
able," as requiring the event actually to prevent performance. See Hawkland, supra note 99, at
76.
136. In effect, the court interpreted the second force majeure provision to provide: "16. In
the event that force majeure renders it commercially impracticable for Buyer to receive gas as
provided in this Contract, an adjustment in the minimum purchase requirements shall be
made."
137. 770 F.2d at 886.
1066 [Vol. 42
COMMENTS
bill provision clearly raises force majeure issues, because it speaks not only of
nonperformance caused by events beyond the control of the buyer but also
specifically incorporates the provisions of the preceding force majeure
clause. 138
The court's asymmetrical analysis ignored the cross-reference included in
the second force majeure provision. The second force majeure provision ex-
cused the buyer's obligation to take gas and accordingly adjusted his duty to
pay when any reason beyond the buyer's control or any event of force
majeure, as provided in the preceding paragraph, rendered him unable to
take gas. Both paragraphs treated causes beyond the buyer's control as ex-
cusing events. According to the terms of paragraph 15, a force majeure
event, whether a specific event or an event under the catch-all language,
arose only if it "prevent[ed] such performance in whole or in part."' 139 The
court, therefore, should only have excused the buyer upon a showing that a
force majeure event prevented its performance under the second clause.14°
Such a construction would have followed the traditionally accepted ap-
proach to contract force majeure clauses. 14' Instead, the court excused the
buyer under the force majeure clause because the buyer's performance had
become commercially impracticable.
The Tenth Circuit's construction of the force majeure clause in Llano
could potentially affect all litigation in which the force majeure defense plays
a part, particularly if the force majeure provision in question uses the term
"unable" to define the causation element required for the excuse. Indeed,
the parties in two pending take-or-pay cases in Oklahoma have already ex-
perienced the effect of construing "unable" to mean "impracticable." ' 14 2 In
138. See supra note 126.
139. 770 F.2d at 882.
140. The court explicitly notes that the buyer could have taken the gas under contract. See
id. at 886. Under the terms of the second force majeure clause, the buyer would then have had
the option under the contract to pay for the minimum amount of gas under the terms of the
take-or-pay provisions without taking any gas. The fact that such payments might financially
burden the buyer would create an issue under § 2-615, but, as shown above, courts are very
unlikely to grant the § 2-615 excuse because of financial hardship. See supra notes 62-66 and
accompanying text.
141. See supra note 99.
142. See Dyco Petroleum Corp. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 86-C-1097-C (N.D. Okla. Sept.
1, 1988); Burkhart Petroleum Corp. v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 87-C-257-C (N.D. Okla. July 5,
1988). Both cases involved virtually identical facts and issues. The primary issue was whether
a governmental order that excused the pipeline's customer from paying any minimum bill
obligation, which requires the customer to pay for a minimum amount of gas whether or not
the customer actually takes the gas, constituted a force majeure event that would excuse the
pipeline from its take-or-pay obligation with the producer. The force majeure clause in each
case read as follows:
If either Buyer or Seller is rendered unable ... by force majeure or any other
cause of any kind not reasonably within its control to perform or comply with
any obligation or condition of this Agreement ... such obligation or condition
shall be suspended during the continuance of the inability so caused and such
party shall be relieved of liability and shall suffer no prejudice for failure to
performs the same during such period .... The term "force majeure" shall
include, without limitation by the following enumeration, acts of God and the
public enemy, the elements, fire, accidents, breakdowns, strikes ... any act or
omission (including failure to take gas) of a purchaser of gas from Buyer which
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both cases a natural gas producer sought damages for an alleged breach by
the pipeline of its take-or-pay obligations. In its defense the pipeline argued
that FERC's promulgation of rule 380,143 which excused pipeline customers
from a duty to pay minimum bill obligations on their gas purchase contracts,
constituted a force majeure event that triggered the excuse afforded in the
clause. In rejecting the producers' motions for summary judgment in both
cases, Judge Cook ruled, on the authority of the Llano decision, that the
term "unable" in a force majeure clause means impracticable. 144 By con-
struing the force majeure clause in this manner, Judge Cook may have al-
tered the course of pending and future take-or-pay litigation.
Several problems arise in the analysis of the orders in these two cases.
First, while changing the burden required to come within the excuse of the
force majeure provision may have had no effect on the motion for summary
judgment, 145 such a finding alters the nature of the proof required at trial,
contrary to the law surrounding the force majeure excuse. Under Judge
Cook's reading of the clause, the pipeline must show that while it could have
performed its obligation to take or pay for gas, the changed circumstances
render that performance commercially impracticable. Under the traditional
reading of a force majeure clause, on the other hand, the pipeline would have
to show that the governmental regulation excusing the pipeline's customer
from taking gas actually prevented the pipeline either from taking or from
paying for the gas under the contract with the producer. It would be diffi-
cult for the pipeline to make this showing. 146
The second problem inherent in Judge Cook's findings parallels a problem
in the Llano decision. The claimed force majeure event, governmental regu-
lation that excused a customer of the pipeline from paying for any gas it did
not take, arguably falls within the terms of the clause. In order for the
is excused by any event or occurrence of the character herein defined as consti-
tuting force majeure... and any laws, order, rules, regulations, acts or restraints
of any government or governmental body or authority ....
Burkhart, No. 87-C-257-C, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Okla. July 5, 1988); Dyco, No. 86-C-1097-C, slip
op. at 2 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 1, 1988).
143. Rule 380 provides:
(a) Limitations. (1) Effective July 31, 1984 any pipeline rate schedule or
tariff governing the sale of natural gas shall be inoperative and of no effect at law
to the extent it provided for recovery of purchased gas costs for gas not taken by
the buyer.
(2) No rate schedule or tariff governing the sale of natural gas and filed on
or after July 31, 1984 may provide for recovery of variable costs associated with
gas not taken by the buyer.
18 C.F.R. § 154.111 (1988).
144. Burkhardt, No. 87-C-257-C, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Okla. July 5, 1988); Dyco, No. 86-C-
1097-C, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 1, 1988).
145, A fact question exists whether the court requires the pipeline to show that the excus-
ing event actually prevented its performance or whether the court requires the pipeline to show
that the excusing event rendered its performance impracticable.
146. As the Llano case indicates, the Tenth Circuit would probably agree with this conclu-
sion. See supra text accompanying note 130. Judge Cook's opinion also fails to address the
law surrounding alternate performance. In order for the pipeline to succeed in its excuse,
whether termed impracticability or prevention of performance because of force majeure, it
must show that both alternatives of its promise suffer from the effect of the occurring event.
See Llano, 770 F.2d at 885.
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clause to excuse the pipeline, however, the pipeline customer's failure must
have occurred as a result of a force majeure event, as defined in the con-
tract.147 While the contract includes as a force majeure event any govern-
mental regulation, such regulation only operates as a force majeure event if it
renders a party unable to perform its obligation. 148 The pipeline made no
such claim, but instead asserted that the FERC action merely excused the
customer's duty to pay for any gas not taken. The FERC action neither
prevented the customer from taking gas nor rendered such taking commer-
cially impracticable.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Llano the court's confusion of the force majeure and commercial im-
practicability excuses has blurred the line that has traditionally divided
them. By so confusing the excuses, the court has altered the agreed-upon
allocation of risk that inheres in all contracts that contain force majeure
clauses, especially if the clauses contain the term "unable." Such an altera-
tion has and will continue to affect take-or-pay litigation, perhaps reversing
the consistent trend favoring producers and clearing a path for new and ex-
pensive litigation concerning the validity of pipelines' take-or-pay obliga-
tions. Perhaps, too, the court's alteration will spur lawyers and businessmen
to include with much more specificity the causation necessary to trigger that
excuse.
147. See supra note 142.
148. The causation element, "render unable," must accompany each and every listed event
in order for the event to rise to the level of force majeure. That is, "any act or omission
(including failure to take gas) of a purchaser of gas from Buyer which is excused by [any
governmental order that renders the customer unable to take gas]" will excuse the pipeline's
performance. See supra note 142. Any other construction would allow a party to claim that
any act of government constitutes force majeure, whether or not such act has any bearing on
the party's performance of the contract.
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